On the Security of NMAC and Its Variants by Liu, Fanbao et al.
TELKOMNIKA, Vol.11, No.2, June 2013, pp. 381~392
ISSN: 1693-6930
accredited by DGHE (DIKTI), Decree No: 51/Dikti/Kep/2010  381
Received December 30, 2012; Revised March 12, 2013; Accepted March 25, 2013
On the Security of NMAC and Its Variants
Fanbao Liu1, Changxiang Shen2, Tao Xie3, Dengguo Feng4
1School of Computer, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha, 410073, Hunan, P. R. China
2School of Computer, Beijing University of Technology, Beijing, 100124, P. R. China
3The Center for Soft-Computing and Cryptology, NUDT, Changsha, 410073, Hunan, P. R. China
4State Key Lab of Information Security, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, P. R. China
e-mail: liufanbao@yahoo.com.cn1
Abstrak
Berdasarkan pada tiga pendekatan konstruksi awal MAC(Message Authentication Code), Kami
mengusulkan dan melakukan analisis terhadap beberapa varian dari NMAC. Kami mengusulkan
beberapa pemulihan serangan kunci pada varian NMAC tersebut, sebagai contoh, kita dapat memulihkan
kunci dalam yang ekuivalen dari NMAC pada sejumlah O(2n/2) operasi MAC, padasetting kunci yang
berhubungan. Kami mengusulkan NMAC-E, suatu varian NMAC dengan secret envelope, untuk mencapai
proses yang lebih efisien dan tanpa kehilangan pada sisi sekuriti, yang hanya membutuhkan satu
panggilan pada fungsi hash yang mendasari, bukan pada dua sperti yang ada pada HMAC.
Kata kunci: NMAC, keying hash function, equivalent key recovery, MAC forgery, birthday attack
Abstract
Based on the three earlier MAC (Message Authentication Code) construction approaches, we
propose and analyze some variants of NMAC. We propose  some key recovery attacks to  these  NMAC
variants, for  example, we can  recover  the  equivalent  inner  key  of NMAC  in  about O(2n/2) MAC
operations, in  a related key  setting. We  propose  NMAC-E, a  variant of NMAC with  secret  envelop,  to
achieve  more  process  efficiency  and  no  loss  of security, which needs only one call to the  underlying
hash  function, instead of two invocations in HMAC.
Keywords: NMAC, keying hash function, equivalent key recovery, MAC forgery, birthday attack
1. Introduction
HMAC (Hash-based Message Authentication Code) [2][3], a derivative of NMAC
(Nested Message Authentication Code), is a practically and commonly used, widely
standardized message authentication code (MAC) construction. HMAC has two advantages.
First,  HMAC can make  use of current  hash  functions,  the  most  widely used ones are based
on Merkle- Damg˚ard construction [5][14], without modification.  Second, it is provable secure
under two assumptions that the  keyed compression  function  of the  underlying  hash  function
and the key derivation function  in HMAC are pseudo random  functions  (PRFs) [2].
After some prevalent iterated hash functions were broken [10][23][24][25][27], the
security of NMAC  and  HMAC  instantiated with  those  hash  functions  were analyzed  [4][
7][21][26], which  emphasized  that NMAC  and  HMAC  instantiated with  broken  hash
functions  are weak.
There  are  mainly  three  kinds  of approaches  to  construct MAC  algorithms  by
keying hash functions  in early days: secret prefix, secret suffix and secret envelop approaches
[20]. The secret prefix approach prepends a secret key K to the message M before hashing
computation, which is the basic design unit of NMAC and HMAC. The secret suffix approach
appends a secret key K to the message M before hashing computation. The secret envelop
approach,  involving  two  keys, prepends  a secret  key K1 and appends  a secret  key K2 to
the  message M, respectively,  before hashing  computation. Based on these approaches and
different key distributions, we propose some NMAC variants (also are HMAC variants), and
analyze their security, by checking whether they are resistant to known attacks, for a better
choice.
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This  paper,  however,  analyzes  the  security  of NMAC  and  its  variants based  on
the assumption that the underlying  hash functions are secure (collision resistance,  CR),
instead of that instantiated with  broken  hash  functions.  We also point  out  that the
assumption of CR is a stronger  notion  than  the  origin assumption of that the  underlying
compression function  is a PRF  [2]. We then  find that NMAC is not secure enough to some
extent,  for example,  its inner key is vulnerable  to equivalent key recovery attack, which needs
O(2n/2) on-line queries and off-line computations, in a related  key setting.
In this paper, we propose some variants of NMAC, and analyze their security, based on
the assumption that the underlying hash functions are secure. We first  point  out  that NMAC1
like the  keyed  input  version  H2-MAC  proposed  in  [31], is vulnerable  to  equivalent  key
recovery  attack with  complexity  about 2n/2 on-line queries. The  security  of NMAC1 and  H2-
MAC  are  totally  dependent  on  the  collision resistance of the  underlying  hash  function,
instead  of the  PRF  property, which directly  violates  the claimed provable  security.
Further, we point out the inner key of NMAC is vulnerable to equivalent key recovery attack, in
a related key setting.  The security strength of NMAC depends on one of its two keys, even if
it’s both keys are independently and randomly generated. We also propose a more secure
variant NMAC-E, which has some advantages compared to NMAC, and HMAC-E.
This paper is divided into seven sections. Section 2 recalls the related definitions and
background. Section 3 proposes and crypt analyzes some NMAC variants including NMAC with
secret prefix approach.  Section 4 proposes and analyzes the security of some NMAC variants
with secret suffix approach.  We present and analyze a better choice of NMAC variant with the
modified version of the secret envelop approach, in section 5. Section six presents some
related work. We conclude the paper in the last section.
2. Preliminaries
2.1 Notations
Let h be a compression function mapping  {0, 1}n×{0, 1}b →{0, 1}n, and let H be a
concrete hash function mapping  {0, 1}* → {0, 1}n. Let IV be the initial chaining variable of H.
Let k denote a secret key with b bits and K denote a secret key with n bits, respectively.  x||y
denotes  the  concatenation of two bit  strings  x and  y. |G| denotes  the  number of elements
of the set G. pad(M) denotes  the padding  bits of M  in Merkle-Damg˚ard style.
2.2 NMAC
NMAC [2] [3], proposed by Bellare et al., is the basis of the most widely used
cryptographic algorithm HMAC.  NMAC  is built from iterated hash  function H, where the  IV
of H  is replaced  with a secret n-bit  key K , the NMAC algorithm  is defined as:
NMAC(Kout,Kin)(M) = H(Kout, H(Kin, M)) (1)
Where keys Kin, Kout ∈ {0, 1}n in NMAC are to replace the  IV  of hash function H  before
further process. In practice, both keys are randomly and independently generated [3].
2.3 Security Notions of MAC
A universal forgery attack results in the ability to forge MACs for any message. A
selective forgery attack results in a MAC tag on a message of the adversary’s choice. An
existential forgery merely results in some valid message/MAC pair not already known to the
adversary.
3. The security of Some Variants with Secret Prefix
3.1   The security of NMAC1 (the keyed IV version of H2-MAC)
We define NMAC1 through keyed IV approach as:
(NMAC1)Kin(M) = H(H(Kin, M)) (2)
Where the IV of the outer hashing of NMAC1 is not replaced with any secret key. A
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keyed input version of NMAC1 was also proposed by Yasuda as H2-MAC [31], which is shown
as (3). It was claimed that H2-MAC gets rid of the disadvantage of the secret key management
without losing the original advantage of HMAC. Wang  announced  an attack to recover  the
equivalent  key of H2-MAC  instantiated with  the  broken  MD5 [25][27], with about  297  on-line
MAC operations  [22]. However, Liu et al. pointed  out  that the  absence of the  outer  key is a
real  threat to  the  security  of H2-MAC [12], they  could  recover  the equivalent key using
birthday paradox  with complexity  of about  O(2n/2) MAC operations.
H2-MACK(M) = H(H(K||pad||M)) (3)
On-Line Birthday Attack for Existential Forgery Attack.
If we apply on-line birth- day attack to NMAC1 oracle, after  about  2n/2 queries, we can
get a collision pair (M, M’) with the same length,  which satisfies NMAC1(M) = NMAC1(M’). Then
for arbitrary message x, the  equation NMAC1(M||pad(M)||x) = NMAC1(M’||pad(M’)||x) always
holds. This  means  that we can  generate  verifiable  forgery  of NMAC1,  we first  query  the
corresponding MAC value of M||pad(M)||x, and we get the very MAC value for M’||pad(M’)||x,
eventually.
This  kind  of attack is  applicable  to  all  MAC  algorithms   instantiated with  Merkle-
Damg˚ ard  hash functions,  also noticed  by  Yasuda  [29]. Hence, the rest of the paper will not
discuss the specified attack again.
Equivalent Key Recovery Attack to NMAC1.
We use the same technologies to recover the equivalent key of NMAC1 as in [12] of H2-
MAC, with slight modifications to achieve more efficiency. We generate the group one G1 using
H(x), instead of H(H(C, Mi)) in [12], which can reduce at least half of the space and time.  We
apply the generalized birthday attack with two groups [8] to NMAC1 and then recover its
equivalent key Ke = H(Kin, Mj).
Here, We first define the notation N2 as N2 = H(x), where x is an n-bit input (key). x can
be viewed as x = H (C, M), where C is a constant and M is the input message. Generally, N2 is
the non-key version of NMAC1. We use different n-bit  input  messages xis (0 ≤ i ≤ 2n − 1) to
generate  the corresponding N2 values,  and  use  different  1-block  messages  Mjs (0 ≤ j ≤ 2n−
1)  to  generate  the corresponding  NMAC1 values. The overall strategy of equivalent key
recovery attack to NMAC1 is shown as follows.
1. Generate a group one G1 with r = 2n/2 elements, by computing the corresponding values of
H(xi) for r different xis, which can be randomly generated.
2. Generate a group two G2 with s = 2n/2 elements, by querying the corresponding values to
NMAC1 oracle with the secret key Kin for s different Mjs, where Mjs are also randomly
generated.
3. There will be some pairs (xi, Mj) that satisfies (NMAC1)Kin(Mj) = N2(xi), with good probability
[8].
4. However, we cannot know that whether xj = H(Kin, Mj) further holds, we need to kick out the
unsatisfied pairs, which will be discussed later in key selection. After that, we have a pair
that satisfies xi = H(Kin, Mj) and (NMAC1)Kin(Mj) = N(xi). So we find out the equivalent key of
NMAC1 of Ke = H(Kin, Mj) = xi.
5. Let  pad0 and  pad1 be the  padding  bits  of Mj and Mj||pad0||x, respectively,  for arbitrary
message x. We generate the intermediate value of H(Kin, Mj||pad0||x) by computing y =
h(Ke,x||pad1), and calculate H(y) further, and get NMAC1(Kin, Mj||pad0||x), eventually.
Key Selection
To select a pair that satisfies xi = H(Kin, Mj), we always assume that each pair we have
is the right pair. To confirm the assumption, we first randomly generate an arbitrary message α;
and then we generate the padding bits pad of the Mj||pad0||α; third, we compute N2(α) = h(xi,
α||pad) and query the corresponding result θ of Mj||pad0||α to NMAC1 oracle, we note that θ
may be computed as follows.
θ = NMAC1(Kin, Mj||pad0||α) = H(h(H(Kin, Mj), α||pad)) (4)
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Finally, we check if N2(α) = θ holds, if so, (xi, Mj) is the right pair. Otherwise, discard that pair.
Success probability and Complexity.
The probability Pr (|G1 ∩ G2| = 0) that there are no distinct element in the intersection of
the two groups is denoted by P (2n, r, s, 0). Let sp denote the success probability of the above
attack (at least one collision pair exists), then we can get the value of sp by computing sp = 1 −
P(2n, r, s, 0) ≥ 0.632 [12]. The elements of group G1 computed by N2 need 2n/2 off-line N2
computations (N2 just consists of one hash computation). The elements of group G2 computed
by NMAC1 need 2n/2 on-line NMAC1 queries. We can store the values of both groups using
hash tables. Then the above algorithm will require O(2n/2) time and space to complete.
We can use the  recovered  equivalent  key Ke to launch  any  selective forgery attack to
NMAC1 without   additional on-line  query,  which  claims  that the  security  of NMAC1 is
broken. Hence, we point out that the security of NMAC1 is solely dependent on the collision
resistance of the underlying hash function, not the strength of the used key.
3.2 The security of NMAC2
We define NMAC2 as:
(NMAC2)Kout(M) = H(Kout, H(M)) (5)
Where the inner key Kin is omitted. This variant NMAC2 was also noted by Bellare et al. in [3].
The outer hashing only accepts H(M) as legal input, which is an n-bit value. Though we can
learn the value of H(Kout, H(M)) easily, we cannot use that information to launch the extension
attack to NMAC2.
Off-Line Birthday Attack to NMAC2
We first apply an off-line birthday attack to H(M). After about 2n/2 off-line computations,
we can get a collision pair (M,M’), which satisfies H(M) = H(M’) and NMAC2(M) = NMAC2(M’),
eventually. Then, NMAC2(M||pad(M)||x) = NMAC2(M’||pad(M’)||x) always holds, for arbitrary
message x. It means that we can generate  verifiable forgery to NMAC2, we first query for the
MAC value of M||pad(M)||x, and get the MAC value for M’||pad(M’)||x, eventually.
3.3 The security of NMAC3
We define NMAC3 as:
(NMAC2)Kio(M) = H(Kio, H(Kio,M)) (6)
Where the inner and outer keys are both set to Kio.
The on-line birthday attack for existential forgery applied to NMAC1 is also applicable to NMAC3
with any modification. Further, we point out that the off-line birthday attack to get existential
forgery is also Applicable to NMAC3 after some optimization. We show the strategy as follows:
1. Query the corresponding MAC value of M0 to the NMAC3 oracle, which will answer H(Kio,
H(Kio, M0)).
2. Assume the unknown H(Kio, M0) be x0, and pad0 be the padding bits of x0. We already know
the corresponding value of H(Kio, x0) (an equivalent key of the inner hashing), which is
NMAC3(M0).
3. Based on the known H(Kio, x0), we launch an off-line birthday attack to find a collision pair
(Mx, Mx’) satisfying H(Kio, x0||pad0||Mx) = H(Kio, x0||pad0||Mx’).
4. For arbitrary message x, we can launch a verifiable forgery attack.
However, since the value of H(Kio, M0) is unknown, how to use the above information to launch
a verifiable forgery attack is still an open problem.
3.4 The security of NMAC
As pointed out by Bellare et al., the on-line birthday attack for existential forgery attack
is also applicable to NMAC [2], here we omit the details.  However, we further notice that we
can generate existential forgery for NMAC, by an off-line birthday attack, which is shown as the
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attack to NMAC2, once the inner key Kin is leaked.
Related Key Attack to Recover the Equivalent Inner Key.
To recover the equivalent inner key Ke with n-bit, we have the following setting for our
related-key attacks on NMAC. There are two oracles NMAC(Kout ,Kin) and NMAC(Kout′, Kin’). We set
the relation between (Kout, Kin) and (Kout′, Kin′) as follows:
Kout = Kout′ and Kin′ ∈ {Constants}
Where these two oracles share the same outer key, and the inner key of NMAC(Kout′, Kin’) can be
any known n-bit Constants, such as the IV of H.
The overall strategy of the equivalent inner key recovery attack to NMAC is shown as follows.
1. Query NMAC(Kout, Kin) oracle for the corresponding values of 2n/2 different  Mis, store their
values in group one G1.
2. Query NMAC(Kout’, Kin’) oracle for the corresponding values of 2n/2 different  Mj′s, store their
values in group two G2.
3. A pair  (Mi, Mj′) satisfies NMAC(Kout ,Kin)(Mi) = NMAC(Kout′, Kin’)(Mj’) (the  generalized birthday
attack with  two  groups),  and  further  satisfies H(Kin, Mi) = H(Kin ′, Mj′) (an inner collision
happens).
4. Since H(Kin, Mi) = H(Kin′, Mj′), and we know the value of Kin′ and  Mj′, hence we can
calculate the very value of Ke = H(Kin, Mi) = H(Kin′, Mj′).
We conclude that the equivalent inner key of NMAC is totally dependent on the generalized
birthday attack, not the strength of the used inner key, in the related key setting. However, if the
outer key Kout of NMAC is leaked, then, it needs a generalized birthday attack to recover the
equivalent inner key to break the entire system, shown as the attack to NMAC1.
From these attacks, we claim that the security of NMAC is dependent on the secrecy of
one of the keys, even if it’s both key are independently and randomly generated. As pointed
out by the  editors  of Cryptology  ePrint Archive in our preliminary  version of this paper, the
equivalent key recovery attack to NMAC is not applicable to the practical HMAC, since the
HMAC keys are derived from a base key, and there  exists no related  key.
4 The security of Some Variants with Secret Suffix
In this section, we discuss the security of some NMAC variants NMAC-Si with secret
suffix approach. We  first  prove  that the  security  of original  secret  suffix is totally  dependent
on  the collision resistance  (CR)  of the  underlying  hash  function.  We then discuss the
security of some variants of NMAC with secret suffix approach.
4.1 The Security of H (M||K)
For  an  n-bit  key K, we will prove  as follows, the  security  of the  secret  suffix M-S is
totally  dependent  on the  collision resistance  of the  underlying  hash  function,  instead  of
the strengthen of the key.
Theorem 1
The  security  of H(M||K) is totally dependent  on the collision resistance  of the
underlying  hash function  H, instead  of the strengthen  of the used key.
We prove Theorem 1 by giving the complexity of the worst case of the key recovery attack and
best case attack, respectively, which are all based on the assumption that the message M is
multiples of bytes.  The worst case of the key recovery attack is that we assume the collision
attack of H has no control over the content of the collision pair (M, M′). The best case is that we
assume the collision attack has full control over some bytes of the collision pair. We notice that
the complexity of the collision attack is 2n/2 hash compressions by an off-line birthday attack,
for a hash function H with n-bit output. The attack is based on the “slice-by-slice” key recovery
of trail key in secret envelop approach, proposed by Preneel et al [16].
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Proof
The Best Case.
Since the  collision attack has  full control  over some bits  of the collision pair, to
recover  each  byte  of the  key  K, only  (28 − 1)  collision pairs  must  be generated  in the
worst case. So we need to generate (28 − 1)(n/16) collision pairs to recover the first n/2 bits of
K, and we can recover the last n/2 bits of K through brute force attack, which needs 2n/2 hash
compressions. So the total complexity of the full key recovery attack is 2n/2×(28 − 1)×(n/16) +
2n/2 < 2n/2+8+log2 n/16 hash compressions.
The Worst Case.
Since the collision attack has no control over any bit of the collision pair, to recover the
j-th (1≤j≤n/8) character of the key K, 28•j collision pairs must be first generated.  So we can
recover the first n/4 bits of the key by generating (28 + 28•2 + • • • + 2n/4) collision pairs, and we
can recover the last 3•n/4 bits through brute force attack, which needs 23•n/4 hash
compressions. The total complexity is 2n/2•(28 + 28•2 + • • • + 2n/4) + 23•n/4 ≈ 2n/2+n/4+1 hash
compressions.
Table 1.  Complexity of Key Recovery Attack to Secret Suffix Approach
All in all then, the complexity of the key recovery to H(M||K) ranges from 2n/2+8+log2n/`16 to 2n/2+n/4+1
hash compressions, which means that the security of M-S is dependent on the collision
resistance  of the  underlying  hash  function  H , instead  of the  strength of the  key. Here, we
assume that the underlying hash function is secure, in fact, for some applications with broken
hash functions; the situation is totally in danger. For example, APOP (Authentication Post Office
Protocol), which is instantiated with broken MD5, applies secret suffix approach; an attacker
can recover the password as long as 352 bits in practical time [11].
We list  the  complexity  of key recovery  attack to  H(M||K) in Table  1, with  different
limitations on  the  input message  M . Word means that M must be multiples of 32-bit words.
However, as shown in Table 1, we point out that both the best and worst cases are exhaustive
key search, if the message M is multiples of n bits.
4.2 The security of NMAC-S1
We define NMAC-S1 as:
(NMAC-S1)Kin(M) = H(H(M||Kin)) (7)
Where the outer key Kout is omitted.  The off-line birthday attack can be applied to NMAC- S1.
Full Key Recovery Attack to NMAC-S1. We can directly apply the full key recovery attack to
H(M||Kin), since the outer hashing does not hide the inner collision. After that, we can fully
recover the inner key of NMAC-S1, and then can construct any verifiable forgery. The
complexity of the key recovery attack to NMAC-S1 can be shown Table 1.
4.3 The security of NMAC-S2
We define NMAC-S2 as:
(NMAC-S2)Kout(M) = H(H(M)||Kout) (8)
Where the inner key Kin is omitted. The off-line birthday attack can be applied to NMAC-S2 .
However, it seems that no key recovery attack to NMAC-S2 can be launched as NMAC-S1.
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H(M) is n bits long, and Kout is also n bits, which means that the concatenation of both are
inside one block, so the slice-by-slice key recovery strategy can’t be applied.  Exhaustive
search must be performed to break the outer key Kout, whose complexity is 2n MAC
computations.
4.4 The security of NMAC-S3
We define NMAC-S3 as:
(NMAC-S3)Kio(M) = H(H(M||Kio)||Kio) (9)
Where the inner and outer keys are equal. The off-line birthday attack can be applied to
NMAC-S3.
Key   Recovery Attack to NMAC-S3
We can directly apply the full key recovery attack to H(M||Kio), since the outer hashing
does not hide the inner collision. After that, we can fully recover the inner key Kio , which is also
the outer key, of NMAC-S3. Finally, we can construct any verifiable forgery. The complexity of
the key recovery attack to NMAC-S3, which is analogous to NMAC-S1, is also shown in Table 1.
4.5 The security of NMAC-S
We define NMAC-S as:
(NMAC-S)(Kin, Kout)(M) = H(H(M||Kin)||Kout)
Where the inner and outer keys are different. The off-line birthday attack can be applied to
NMAC-S.
Inner Key Recovery Attack to NMAC-S.
We can directly apply the full key recovery attack to H(M||Kin), since the outer hashing
does not hide the appearance of the inner collision. After that, we can fully recover the inner
key Kin of NMAC-S.  However, with Kin, we can’t directly construct any verifiable forgery, thanks
to the outer hashing with the unknown Kout . The outer key Kout can’t be recovered like Kin,
which is also analyzed in NMAC-S2. It seems that we have to apply additional off-line birthday
attack to H(M), for a meaningful existential forgery.
4.6 Counterpart for the Key Recovery Attack to NMAC-S Variants
To avoid the full key recovery attack to NMAC-S Variants, we modify the inner hashing
form H(M||Kin). We always assume that n|b, which means that b is the multiples of n. Let padn
(1||0*) be the padding bits of M, padn is defined as
n|(|M| + |padn|) (10)
We re-define the inner hashing form as:
H(M||padn||Kin)
Where the inner key Kin resides as a whole part on the input block. We have the following
theorem for the key recovery attack.
Theorem 2
Slice-by-slice key recovery strategy cannot be applied to H(M||padn||Kin), for launching key
recovery attack.
Proof.  Since n|b and n|(|M| + |padn|), and |Kin| = n, then n|(|M||padn||Kin|), hence, no slice can be
made to the key Kin.
However, the NMAC-S Variants after modification are still vulnerable to off-line birthday attack
for existential forgery attack.
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5. The security of an NMAC Variant with Secret Envelop
In last two sections, we discuss the security of NMAC variants with secret prefix and
secret suffix, respectively.  In this section, we discuss the security of an NMAC variant, NMAC-
E, with secret envelop approach.
5.1     NMAC-E with Modified Secret Envelop
We  propose  NMAC-E  with  modified  version  of the  secret  envelop approach,
which  has the advantage of both equivalent key recovery resistance  and slice-by-slice key
recovery resistance.  The  modification  is straightforward, we pad  the  input  message M  with
padn, which can be some fixed constants, before appending  the outer key K . We define
NMAC-E as:
NMAC-E(K) = H (K, M||padn||K)
Where K is a randomly generated n-bit key. M ||padn is multiples of n bits.
5.2 The security of NMAC-E
Off-Line Birthday Attack Resistance.
NMAC-E is resistant to off-line birthday attack for existential forgery, thanks to the
secret “IV”, the key K. Without any knowledge about the “IV”, the off-line birthday attack to find
a collision pair can’t be launched.
Equivalent Key Recovery Attack Resistance.
NMAC-E is resistant to equivalent key recovery attack, thanks to the appended key K.
Even if the attacker can find out the result of NMAC-E(K) easily, no extension attack can be
launched; hence, no equivalent key recovery attack happens.
Slice-by-Slice Key Recovery Attack Resistance.
NMAC-E is also resistant to slice-by-slice key recovery attack as proven in Theorem 2.
Divide-and-Conquer Exhaustive-Search Key Recovery.
The divide-and-conquer exhaustive-search key recovery [16] cannot be applied  to
NMAC-E,  since our scheme use one key, and  a brute  force attack should  be performed  to
find out  the  key. The attacks performed to NMAC also show that it is not necessary to bind two
keys to strengthen the MAC scheme.
On-Line Birthday Attack.
The on-line birthday attack is applicable to NMAC-E, after about 2n/2 on-line MAC
queries, a collision pair may be found that NMAC-E(M) = NMAC-E(M′).
We list the security properties of all NMAC variants discussed in this paper, in Table 2. OFBAR
stands for off-line birthday attack resistance, ONBAR stands for on-line birthday attack
resistance,  EKRAR means  equivalent  key recovery  attack resistance,  SSKRAR means
slice-by-slice  key  recovery  attack resistance,   DCESKRR stands   for  divide-and- conquer
exhaustive- search key recovery resistance.  means there only one key exists.
Table 2.  Security Comparison between NMAC Variants
MAC OFBAR ONBAR EKRAR SSKRAR DCESKRR
NMAC1 Yes No No Yes 
NMAC2 Yes No No Yes 
NMAC3 Yes No No Yes No
NMAC Yes No No Yes No
NMAC-S1 No No Yes No 
NMAC-S2 No No Yes No 
NMAC-S3 No No Yes No No
NMAC-S No No Yes No No
NMAC-E Yes No Yes Yes 
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Performance Analysis of NMAC-E.
NMAC-E uses only one call of the underlying hash function, but introduces a message
padding process, compared to NMAC.  However, since the padding  happens  at the tail of the
message M , and the filling bits of pad are some constants, which  aims  to  align  the  input
block M′ to  be multiples  of b bits,  the  cost  of padding  is negligible, especially for long
message. Moreover, NMAC-E processes only one more block, compared to the inner hashing
of NMAC. Hence, the NMAC-E is efficient than NMAC.
5.3     Security Proof for NMAC-E
We first recall the Theorem 3.1 of [1]; it says that H* is a pf-VI-PRF, if the underlying
compression function h is an FI-PRF. we list the detail of the Theorem as follow, where we
change the notions to suitable this paper.
Theorem 3.1 of [1].
Let h be a function family with Dom(h) = {0, 1}b, Range(h) = {0, 1}n, and key length n.
Suppose h is (t, q, 1, ε)-secure and let l ≥ 1. Then h* is (t, q, l, ε)-secure against prefix-free
distinguishers, where
t = t′ − cq.(l + n + b).(Time(h) + log q)
ε = qlε′
Here, c is a specific, small constant whose value can be determined from the proof. For the
detail of this proof, please refer [1].
In [1], a construction called  Facsc was proposed to construct VI-PRF  family δ−AF*, based  on
an  FI-PRF. δ−AF  is constructed as follows. Given  a family  F  with key length n + δ, having key
(K, d) where K ∈{0, 1}n and d∈{0, 1}δ , let δ−AFK,d(x) = F(x||d) for all b-bit x. Finally, δ−AF* is a VI-
PRF, which is provided by Corollary 4.2 of [1].
Corollary 4.2 of [1].
Let h be a function  family with Dom(h) = {0, 1}b , Range(h) = {0, 1}n,  and  key length
n. Suppose h is (t, q, 1, ε)-secure and let l ≥ 1. Then δ-Ah* is (t, q, l, ε)-secure, where
t = t′ − cq.(n + b + (l + log δ).Time(h) + (n + l + b).log q)
ϵ = lqϵ′ + blq2−α .
However, we can’t get the conclusion that NMAC-E is a VI-PRF  directly,  based on the both
conclusions of [1], since another  part  padding  is inserted  between  the message M  and the
“δ” key Ki2 in NMAC-E.
We notice that NMAC-E(K) = H ∗(K, M ||padn ||K), where M is first padded with some
fixed bits, and then transferred to be processed by H. We divide the proof of that; NMAC-E is a
PRF if the underlying h is a dual PRF, into two parts.  First, we prove that H ∗(K, M ||padn) is a
pf-VI-PRF. Second, we prove that NMAC-E is a PRF under the sole assumption that the
underlying compression function h is a PRF.
Theorem 3.
If the compression function h of the underlying hash function H is a PRF, then H*(K, M||padn),
where padn is the padding bits of M without length information, is a pf-VI-PRF.
Proof.  From the Theorem 3.1 of [1], we know that H*(K, M) is a pf-PRF if the underlying
compression function h is a PRF.  Since the content of padn (the number of ‘0’s to be filled) is
totally determined by the length of M, which means it is obviously known. Hence, M||padn is not
prefix-free, we can directly get the conclusion that H*(K, M||padn) is a pf-VI-PRF, if the
underlying h is a PRF.
Based on the Theorem 3 and the corollary 4.2 of [1], we can get the conclusion that
NMAC-E is a PRF under the sole assumption that the underlying compression function h is a
PRF.
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Theorem 4.
If the compression  function  h of the underlying  hash function  H  is a PRF, then  NMAC-E(K)
construction H*(K, M||padn||K ),  where padn is the padding bits of M without length information,
is a VI-PRF.
Proof.  This theorem can be conducted directly based on the Theorem 3 and the Corollary
4.2 of [1].
5.4     HMAC-E
To utilize the advantage of NMAC-E and to employ the underlying  hash functions as a
black box like HMAC, we also propose a “HMAC”  version of the NMAC-E,  named  HMAC-E.
We define HMAC-E as:
HMAC-E = HMAC-E(K) = H (K||M ||padn||K)
Where K is an n-bit key.
HMAC-E  is a PRF  under  the  sole assumption that the  underlying hash  function  is
a dual PRF,  the  proof is similar to the  security  proof of NMAC-E,  for the  lack of space, we
omit the details. HMAC-E calls the underlying hash function H only once, whereas HMAC
requires two invocations of H, and HMAC-E involves no key derivation. HMAC-E can achieve
more process efficiency, compared to HMAC, and without loss of security.
6. Related Work
The ENMAC algorithm [15] increases efficiency over HMAC using a secret-prefix
approach for short messages. The MDP construction [9] operates as a secret-prefix MAC
algorithm for messages of any length by applying a permutation. The Sandwich construction
[30] is similar to our proposed NMAC-E, but it suffers low efficiency over short messages
compared to our scheme. The L-Lane HMAC construction [29] was proposed to avoid the
general birthday attack to HMAC. The BNMAC algorithm [28] aim to improve efficiency over
HMAC, using single key approach.  The  H2-MAC  construction [31], omitting  the  outer  hash
of HMAC, tends  to  improve  efficiency over HMAC  with  provable  secure,  but  recent
research  shows that it is vulnerable  to equivalent  key recovery  attack [12] based  on the
assumption that the underlying  hash function  is (weak) collision resistance.
7. Conclusion and Future Work
Based on the three earlier approaches to construct MAC algorithms and different key
distributions, we propose a series of NMAC variants, we also analyze those variants in order to
find a better and more secure one. We find a variant of NMAC, named NMAC-E, with the
modified version of the secret envelop approach, and can withstand all known attacks to MAC
algorithms.
We notice that all kinds of NMAC variants, based on Merkle-Damg˚ard construct hash
functions, are vulnerable to the on-line birthday attack for verifiable forgery. In fact, a pair (Mi,
Mj′), which has the same MAC value after about 2n/2 on-line queries, is acceptable to some
extent. It is not a forgery in this situation, since we have already queried the MAC oracle for
their corresponding MAC results. The only problem is that, there are so many collision pairs
after the concatenation of arbitrary message x, once a collision pair is found.
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